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INTRODUCTION
 By careful collation of past events it becomes clear that certain lines of conduct tend 
 normally to produce certain effects; that wars tends to take certain forms each with 
 a marked idiosyncrasy; that these forms are normally related to the object of the 
 war and to its value to one or both belligerents..1
Sir Julian S Corbett, prominent naval historian and seapower theorist
 Seapower theory is intended to explain the nature, character, characteristics, 
and conduct of war in the maritime domain. Theory about war and the maritime, 
and about naval warfare, certainly shares some basic traits with the physical sci- 
ences in the use of observation, description, measurement, and structured analysis 
supporting causal inferences or explanatory hypotheses. However, it also remains 
distinct from the physical sciences in significant ways, most notably in the absence 
of controlled, replicable experimentation as means of validating theory. For this 
and as warfare largely is a social activity, the conceptual foundations of the field 
reside more appropriately in the realm of the social sciences.2 The nature of infor- 
mation, particularly pertaining to environments where data is dispersed, tacitly 
understood, or in forms resistant to detection, collection, and analysis, thus ren- 
dering it too subjective to be a basis for scientifically valid conclusions. War and 
warfare are nothing but such environments, i.e. complex human interaction were 
information always is fraught with uncertainty. Moreover, theory formation in 
such an environment is a function of information availability.3 Therefore, seapower 
theory cannot have the same precision or consistency in its generalisable claims as 
e.g. physics. Moreover, it is doubtful that any form of experiment short of actual war 
could be conducted to support, refute, or validate seapower theories due to wars 
inherent complexity. Furthermore, whilst unsuccessful experiments are simply a 
part of the process of scientific investigation in most sciences; unsuccessful military 
experiments, that is war, cause the downfall of regimes, nations, and world orders. 
Hence, although seapower theories may have an empirical basis, they are generally 
not tested, and their range of application are not known.4 Military theory is conse- 
1  Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: The Project Gutenberg eBook,  
  1911 (electronic reproduction 2005)), p. 9
2  Paraphrasis of: Glenn Voelz, "Is Military Science Scientific?," Joint Force Quarterly : JFQ 75 4th  
  Quarter (2014).
3  Ibid.
4  Paragraph is inspired by: Berndt Brehmer, "The research basis for teaching war studies - or for  
  the officer profession," in War Studies: Perspectives from the Baltic and Nordic War Colleges ed.  
  Tom Kristiansen and John Andreas Olsen (Oslo: Institutt for forsvarsstudier, 2007), p. 35., Jerker  
  J Widén, Theorist of maritime strategy: Sir Julian Corbett and his contribution to military and 
  naval thought, Corbett centre for maritime policy studies, (Milton Park: Routledge, 2016),  
  pp. 155-156., Robert P. Pellegrini, The Links between Science, Philosophy, and Military Theory:  
  Understanding the Past, Implications for the Future (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University  
  Press, 1997), p. 43, and Henry E. Eccles, "Military theory and education; The need for and nature  
  of," Naval War College Review 21, no. 6 (1969): p. 72.
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quently not theory in the ordinary sense of empirically tested propositions.5 This 
represent a challenge that is subject to controversy and constitute a major, and 
persistent, theoretical discourse in seapower theory.6
 In this paper I will investigate if there are other methods, i.e. in lieu of exper- 
imentation, that can lead to coherent and reliable seapower theory, whether universal 
or specific, normative, or explanatory. There are many research traditions in social 
sciences. Each tradition is a way to understand knowledge building and its validity, 
and each tradition comes with their respective ontologies, epistemology, and their 
corresponding methodological approaches, and they all have their strengths and 
weaknesses.7 Here, I will discuss the incontrovertible most used methodology in 
seapower theorisation; the use of history to develop and test seapower theory, and 
the resulting implications for those theories’ explanatory and normative status.
DEFINING SEAPOWER THEORY
 Seapower theory is a subset of military theory that is intended to explain the 
nature, character, and characteristics of war in and from the maritime domain.8 
Thereto a substantial part of seapower theory deals with how navies can be 
instruments of and influences on foreign policy.9 Seapower theory fits well within 
the broad definition of military theory; i.e. a theory which is primarily concerned 
with the nature and character of war as well as the successful conduct of war.10 This 
is theory of war employing Clausewitz’s ontological understanding of war; meaning 
that war is, and always has been, organised violence conducted for political ends.11 
5  Brehmer, "War Studies," 28, and 35-36.
6  See for instance: Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (London: Frank  
  Cass Publishers, 2004), pp. 29-30., and Jan Tore Nilsen in: Harald Høiback and Palle Ydstebø,  
  eds., Krigens vitenskap: en innføring i militærteori (Oslo: Abstrakt forl., 2012), pp. 183-185.
7  Josep Gallifa, "Research traditions in social sciences and their methodological rationales,"  
  Aloma 36 (01/01 2018). and Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power : Explaining Victory and Defeat  
  in Modern Battle, Kindle edition. ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 20
8  Although not a point of departure for this paper, it can be argued that seapower theory only  
  normally is a subset of military theory. This as, for countries that is entirely depended on the  
  maritime, economically as well as military, it could very well be that seapower theory, or rather  
  maritime strategy, determine their comprehension of military theory, i.e. that the use of sea 
  power is not part of an overall military strategy – but does indeed determine that strategy (Tor  
  Ivar Strømmen, "Bulwark and balancing act: the strategic role of the Royal Norwegian Navy," in  
  Europe, small navies and maritime security : balancing traditional roles and emergent threats  
  in the 21st century, ed. Robert McCabe, Deborah Sanders, and Ian Speller (London: Routledge,  
  Taylor & Francis Group, 2020).). 
9  See for instance: Ken Booth, Navies and foreign policy (London: Routledge, 1977 (reprinted:  
  2014)). In pp. 15-25 Booth explains this elegantly through his seapower triangle.
10  Jerker Widén and Jan Ångström, Contemporary Military Theory: The dynamics of war (London:  
  Routledge, 2015), p. 7. 
11  Colin S. Gray, "The Changing Nature of Warfare?," Naval War College Review 49, no. 2 (1996):  
  p. 8. A more detailed explanation of the ontology of war according to Clausewitz, is that it  
  places fighting at its centre. Clausewitz claims that fighting is as definitive for war as mone- 
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The nature of war, according to Clausewitz, describes its unchanging essence, 
meaning  those things that differentiate war (as a phenomenon) from other things. 
The character of war describes the changing way that war as a phenomenon mani- 
fests in the real world. As war is a political act that takes place in and among 
societies, its specific character will be shaped by those politics and those societies—
by what Clausewitz called the “spirit of the age.” War’s conduct is undoubtedly 
influenced by technology, law, ethics, culture, methods of social, political, and 
military organisation, and other factors that change across time and place.12 
Military theory can therefore be described as a comprehensive analysis of all the 
aspects of warfare, its patterns and inner structures, and the mutual relationships 
of its various elements.
 It also encapsulates political, economic, and social relationships within a society 
and among the societies that create a conflict and lead to a war. Finally, it includes 
the use of military force to prevent the outbreak of war and to control escalation 
after the opening of war.13
 Military theories are both normative and explanatory. Military theory is multi-
disciplinary in so far as one needs to understand the political, strategic, operational, 
and tactical processes in war, but the subject mainly deals with the military aspects 
of war – not everything that concerns war.14
 Military history is a body of knowledge about the past that relates to armed 
forces. Warfare, the employment of organised violence, or the preparation to em- 
ploy violence, lies at the heart of the discipline.15 Comparing that my definition 
of military theory above, one see that military history and theories both concern 
themselves with the same topic. So, what does actually set them apart? Widén and 
Ångström explains this rather elegantly. They write that military theory, unlike 
history, deals with the general rather than the specific, the abstract rather than 
  tary exchange for economy. He explicitly defines war as fighting, a duel with violence as its  
  means. War is an act of politics, where the dictation of the law by one side to the other gives  
  rise to ‘a sort of reciprocal action’. War always consists of hostile bodies and each has the same  
  object – to force the other to submit (Astrid H. M. Nordin and Dan Öberg, "Targeting the  
  Ontology of War: From Clausewitz to Baudrillard," Millennium 43, no. 2 (2014).)  Some theorists  
  challenges the continued relevance of Clausewitz’s ontology and his division into unchanging  
  nature, and changing character of war, but is beyond the scope of this paper. See for instance:  
  Jan Ångström and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, eds., Rethinking the Nature of War (London: Frank Cass, 
  2005). for a good introduction to this debate.
12  Christopher Mewett, "Understanding war’s enduring nature alongside its changing character,"  
  War on the Rocks (January 21, 2014). See also sub-chapter The use and abuse of history below  
  were the interaction between the nature and character of war is discussed in more detail.
13  Milan Vego, "On Military Theory," Joint Force Quarterly : JFQ, no. 62 (2011): p. 60. 
14  Widén and Ångström, Contemporary Military Theory: The dynamics of war p. 7. 
15  Ian Speller, "The use and abuse of history by the military," in Building a better future (Maynooth:  
  Irish Defence Forces: MACE Publications, 2012), p. 2. Stephen Morillo, in his great introductory  
  work to military history have a very similar definition (Stephen Morillo and Michael F. Pavkovic,  
  What is military history?, 3rd ed., What is history?, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017), pp. 3-6.)
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the tangible, and the timeless rather than the contextual.16 In military history, 
researchers tend to see their specific object of study as meaningful in and of itself, 
while, in military theory, they view the subject of research as a case of a large 
universe of comparable phenomena.17 This does not, however, mean that military 
historians never theorise or that military theorists never investigate the unique.18 
The difference between their approaches has, however, consequences with regard 
to the extent that generalisations can be regarded as valid and relevant. The per- 
spective that the object of a historical study is unique per se is, if we take it to its 
logical conclusion, is not compatible with generalising one’s conclusions to other 
cases. By definition, military theory has, therefore, generalising aims, and it is 
something “more” than just a description of war and warfare.19 It often aims to be 
normative – or is at least viewed as such by many of its practitioners.
SEAPOWER THEORY AS EXPLANATORY AND 
NORMATIVE THEORY
 A normative theory evaluates and describes, or generalises, facts or causal 
relations. It states “good” ways of doing things, or the “right” way of thinking. It is 
essentially a guide, a prescription of norms and standards which its practitioners 
ought to follow. In seapower theory there is often a tension between explanatory 
statements about the causal relationships in maritime strategy (what is) and 
providing norms and guidelines for action (what ought to be). According to Widén, 
this tension is so profound that seapower theory in a historical sense has been 
dominated by normative rather than explanatory theory. Seapower theory more 
often than not promotes new doctrines in naval operations and does not constitute 
theory to grasp and comprehend maritime war and naval warfare as whole, nor 
to obtain thrust about the principles of maritime strategy.20 Widén’s statement is 
rather unforgiving, but carries much weight. The explanatory powers of a theory, 
and hence the enhanced understanding it provides, is key to a good theory of lasting 
importance. A theory formulated in or to a specific time, technology, or space, would 
almost by default constitute a theory that, if used under other conditions, would be 
questionable at best.21 Friedrich Hayek identified a similar phenomenon in his own 
field of economics, notably articulated during his 1974 Nobel Prize lecture, were 
he points out that circumstances defining outcomes in complex environments are 
rarely, if ever, fully accessible to the researcher, policymaker, or military planner, no 
matter how information is collected and acted upon.22 The crux of military theory 
16  Widén and Ångström, Contemporary Military Theory: The dynamics of war p. 5.
17  Ibid.
18  Ibid.
19  Ibid.
20  Widén, Theorist of maritime strategy: Sir Julian Corbett and his contribution to military and  
  naval thought, pp. 155-156.
21  This paragraph is inspirred by: ibid., pp. 3-4.
22  Paraphrasis of: Voelz, "Is Military Science Scientific?."
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lies in the use of appropriate methods to achieve a satisfactory application of theory 
to each particular case.23 That is in fact the domain of doctrine, i.e. applied use 
military theory in a specific context.24 Hence, when theory becomes normative, it 
removes itself from theory and tend towards being a specific strategy or doctrine. 
Thereto, a normative theory is scientifically problematic since it is inherently based 
on value judgements that are difficult to disprove factually and rationally, or which 
is only relevant for its time and place.25 For instance did Mahan make the conquest 
and retention of oversea markets dependent not so much upon economical ability 
as upon military force. A statement that could be seen as fairly accurate in the age 
of mercantilism, but not so anymore.26
 As military theories cannot be refined by continuous testing in a controlled 
environment, military theory ought to make general, rather than specific, predic- 
tions. Such general predictions are much harder to disprove and without continual 
testing, and hence the ability to prove a theory wrong, other more unscientific 
influences comes to bear on the relevance of military theory. Tradition, careerism, 
interservice rivalries, and domestic politics, thus could allow military theories to 
survive and be used long past the time when they have relevance.27
 Furthermore, a majority of the important Western military theorists are asso- 
ciated with the great powers of the world. Moreover, most of the empirical studies 
focus on cases where at least one side in the contest is a great power, especially 
so in the maritime domain. This begs the question to what extent there is a great 
power bias in the field that renders generalisations to smaller powers invalid? There 
are obviously research results and theoretical arguments, generated from studies of 
great powers that only partly can be transferred to other countries and areas.28 An 
important example would be Mahan’s renowned seapower theory. Mahan failed 
to make clear, or at least touched upon only by implication, the fact that all those 
advantages he promoted were the accompaniment not of Seapower as such, but of 
superior Seapower.29
23  Raoul Castex, Strategic Theories (edited and translated version of French originals from 1931- 
  39), ed. Eugenia C. Kiesling (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994), p. 17.
24  Till, Seapower, p. 33. and James J. Tritten, Naval Perspectives for Military Doctrine  
  Development, NDC (Norfolk, 1994)..
25  This paragraph is inspirred by: Widén, Theorist of maritime strategy: Sir Julian Corbett and his  
  contribution to military and naval thought, pp. 3-4.
26  Herbert Rosinski, The Development of Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski, ed. Benjamin  
  Mitchell Simpson III (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977), p. 28.
27  Pellegrini, The Links between Science, Philosophy, and Military Theory: Understanding the Past,  
  Implications for the Future, p. 43. See also: Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War:  
  Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 1-4.
28  Widén and Ångström, Contemporary Military Theory: The dynamics of war p. 3. See also: Milan  
  Vego, Maritime Strategy and Sea Denial: Theory and Practice (Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), vii.
29  Rosinski, The Development of Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski, p. 22.
193
WHY THE CLOSE INTERRELATIONSHIP WITH HISTORY?
 If we investigate the most renowned seapower theories, all of them utilises 
history as its empirical basis and are littered with historical examples.30 Why is 
it so? Colin Gray offers a useful, but simplistic answer; History is important to 
seapower theory because, “historical experience is literally our sole source of evi- 
dence on strategic phenomena as the future has not yet happened.”31 Along the 
same lines, Milan Vego says that it is military and naval history that allows a 
theorist to select historical examples to either clarify or obtain evidence in support 
of a given statement or theoretical construct.32 That statement is important, as that 
would likewise mean that other historical examples could weaken or invalidate the 
very same theoretical constructs.
 The interrelationship between history and seapower theories can be traced back 
to the latter half of the 19th century when Sir John Laughton developed ‘scientific’ 
naval history as a mean for the ‘higher education’ of naval officers in matters 
of strategy and tactics.33 He claimed that the role of naval history was first and 
foremost as a vehicle for the development of naval doctrine.34 He became hugely 
influential not only for his methodology, but more so because of his friends and 
extensive correspondence with the major names in his field – historians like 
Gardiner, as well as naval intellectuals like the Colomb brothers, Bridge, Mahan, 
Corbett, and Luce.35 Seapower theories promulgated by this circle of theorists 
still incontestably constitute theoretical benchmarks in the field. They hold such 
30  For instance, Mahan’s most influential work, The Influence of Seapower upon history 1660-1783, 
  is nearly 80-90% historical analysis. The theoretical synthesis constitutes merely 10% of his work 
   (Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (New York: Dover  
  Publications, 1890 (reprint:1987)).). Some other publications from leading theorists that  
  exemplifies my statement: Julian S. Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy (New York: Dover  
  Publications Inc., 1911 (reprint: 2004)); Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett, Seapower and  
  Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989); Castex, Strategic Theories (edited and  
  translated version of French originals from 1931-39); Booth, Navies and foreign policy; Wolfgang 
  Wegener, The Naval Strategy of the World War (translated and reprinted 1989) (Annapolis:  
  Naval Inst Press, 1929); Sergei G. Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State (Annapolis: Naval  
  Institute Press, 1979); Milan Vego, Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and Practice (New York:  
  Routledge, 2009); Edward N. Luttwak, The political uses of sea power (Johns Hopkins University  
  Press, 1974); Till, Seapower; Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power (London: Routledge, 1990).
31  Colin S. Gray, ed., Strategy and History: Essays on theory and practice (London: Routledge,  
  2006), pp. 5-6.
32  Vego, "On Military Theory," p. 66.
33  Andrew Lambert, The foundations of naval history : John Knox Laughton, the Royal Navy and  
  the historical profession (London: Chatham Publishing, 1998), as summed up on the back  
  jacket of the book. 
34  Ibid., p. 219. With regards to doctrine: Till, Seapower, p. 33. and Tritten, Military Doctrine  
  Development..
35  Lambert, The foundations of naval history : John Knox Laughton, the Royal Navy and the  
  historical profession, as summed up on the back jacket of the book. The Colomb brothers, Bridge, 
  Mahan and Luce are undoubtedly among the most important writers and theorists of sea- 
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a status that it has almost led to a paradigmatic interrelationship between naval 
history and seapower theory. An interrelationship that continues to dominate sea- 
power discourse to this day, and which has caused numerous other naval intellect- 
uals to adopt akin methodology to Mahan.36 Similar theoretical developments also 
took place amongst, for instance, Swedish and French naval theorists, and almost 
independently from Anglo-Saxon thinking.37 Hence, thinkers with very different 
outlooks came to use basically the same approach to develop their theories.
 This almost paradigmatic interrelationship is not without rational, it is actually 
fairly obvious. The study of military history offers the opportunity to learn from 
experience that is longer, wider and more varied than that of any individual.38 
Which is especially important for a profession that is, hopefully, never or very 
seldomly used for its ultimate purpose. Or in Michael Howards words “The mili- 
tary professional is almost unique in that he may only have to exercise his pro- 
fession once in a lifetime, if indeed that often.”39 Ian Speller thus claims that an 
understanding of history is a necessary requirement for any theory of war that is 
based on more than unfounded speculation.40 Unfortunately, the mere occurrence 
of copious references to historical case studies does not tell us anything about 
the theory’s factual qualities. In the better cases, history is used as evidence upon 
which theory is based, in other cases, history is nothing but cosmetics for a theory 
devised totally independent of serious historical research.41 Military theories 
  power in its formative phase in the late 19th century. The Colomb brothers in particular were  
  seminal in the use of history to assist in the advancement of naval theory (Charles Oliviero, 
  "The Complex Web of Western Military Theory (A New Model for the Investigation of Western 
  Military Theory)" (PHD Royal Military College of Canada, 2006), p. 175.)
36  Examples include, but is certainly not limited to: a Swedish work by Munthe and Unger in three  
  volumes’: Arnold Munthe, Sjømaktens inflytande på Sveriges historia, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Stockholm:  
  Marinelitteraturføreningens førlag, 1921); Arnold Munthe, Sjømaktens inflytande på Sveriges  
  historia, 3 vols., vol. 2 (Stockholm: Marinelitteraturføreningens førlag, 1922); Gunnar Unger,  
  Sjømaktens inflytande på Sveriges historia, 3 vols., vol. 3 (Stockholm:  
  Marinlitteraturenføreningens førlag, 1929). and the German Hermann Kirchhoff, Seemacht in  
  der Ostsee, 2 vols. (Kiel: Corodes, 1908).
37  In Sweden Julius Mankel used Swedish naval history to formulate strategic and tactical 
  guidelines for Swedish naval forces already in 1855. (Julius Mankell, Studier öfver svenska  
  skärgårds-flottans historia, krigssätt och användande vid Sveriges försvar (Stockholm:  
  Hörbergska boktryckeriet, 1855).) Likewise, the French Jeune Ecole naval theories from the  
  1870’s was partly based on France’s long historical experience with guerre de course, i.e. 
  commerce raiding. (Rolf Hobson, Krig og strategisk tenkning i Europa 1500-1945 : samfunns- 
  endring, statssystem, militær teori (Oslo: Cappelen akademisk forl., 2005), p. 250. and Arne  
  Røksund, The Jeune École: The Strategy of the Weak, 1st ed., History of Warfare Series volume  
  43, (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 1-5.)
38  Basil Henry Liddel Hart, Why Don't We Learn from History? (Philadelphia: Lulu Press, 1971 (as  
  reprinted in 2015)), Part 1.
39  Michael Howard, "The use and abuse of military history," Royal United Services Institution.  
  Journal 107, no. 625 (1962): p. 6.
40  Speller, "The use and abuse of history by the military," pp. 9-10.
41  Ibid., p. 9.
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removed from thorough historical analysis and understanding is thus often, to 
quote Colin Gray, “repackaging the obvious in ways that mislead the credulous.”42 
Such theories, according to Speller, does not add much intellectual value as they 
are often nothing but pure speculation and can accordingly often be badly flawed.43
THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY
 Although historical analysis as shown constitutes a major component in devel- 
oping and formulating military theory, the way it is used varies widely. Its use is 
not one but numerous related approaches that could be classified along the lines of 
for instance event-centred empirical analysis and comparative historical analysis. 
Regardless of definitions, pitfalls, and incomplete data, the use of history by sea- 
power theorists irrespectively aims at making generalisations and identify causal 
relationships on basis of historical analysis. But could we use historic analysis for 
such a purpose?
 With historical example as its laboratory, military theory relies on ex post facto 
analysis of what are essentially natural experiments. This entails several limitations. 
As a mode of analysis, historical narrative is fundamentally linear and deterministic 
by nature. Its aim is to find causality, thereby minimising the role of chance. It veils 
complexity and shies from ambiguity. Its vernaculars tend toward the anecdotal, 
interpersonal, and spectacular. History does not always know what it does not know. 
Ultimately, what it provides is reasoning by induction—drawing general rules from 
specific examples. It is non-empirical in that it relies on uncontrolled data. Perhaps 
most importantly, as a basis for applied theory, it lacks mechanisms of validation 
through experimental replication—the essence of scientific methodology.44
 However, if we on the other hand look at how Sir Michael Howard approach 
this issue, a more constructive and positive view emerge. Howard once wrote that 
“even after all allowances have been made for contextual differences throughout 
history, wars have elements that resemble each other more than they resemble 
other human activities. Wars are nothing but men trying to impose their will 
on one another by violence.”45 All wars, according to such a view, thus consist of 
features that are unchangeable or constant regardless of the era in which they are 
fought and those that are transitory or specific to a certain era. This is arguably one 
of the most important aspects of Clausewitz’s concept of war, an aspect in which 
a phenomenon, war, is considered to have both objective and subjective natures.46 
The objective nature of war includes those elements – such as violence, friction, 
42  Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2005),  
  p. 143.
43  Speller, "The use and abuse of history by the military," pp. 9-10.
44  Voelz, "Is Military Science Scientific?."
45  Howard, "The use and abuse of military history," p. 7.
46  Sir Michael Howard was an ardent student of Clausewitz, see: Beatrice Heuser, "Captain  
  Professor Sir: Some Lessons from Michael Howard," War on the Rocks (February 27, 2020 2020).
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chance, and uncertainty – that all wars have in common. By contrast, the subjective 
nature of war (the character of war) encompasses those elements – such as military 
forces, their doctrines, weapons, as well as environments (land, sea, air, and 
danger) in which they fight – that make each war unique. According to Clausewitz’s 
concept, the objective and subjective natures of war interact continuously. Thus, 
the nature of war cannot be separated from the means and the actors involved in 
its conduct.47 Generalisations on basis of the nature of war will therefore have a 
degree of universal applicability and does consequently delineate changes in the 
character of war. This even as, also according to the Prussian, war’s nature does not 
change—only its character.48
 Military historians since Thucydides have extended their gifts into the present. 
Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Delbrück, Fuller, Liddel Hart, Mahan, Corbett, the 
Colomb brothers, Till, Howard – and the list goes on, were not imprisoned by 
their discipline. They readily engaged in great questions of their time – and indeed 
this was what led to them developing military and naval theory. Among military 
theorists, Clausewitz, and Delbrück in particular, were careful to draw a distinction 
between the attainment of knowledge and the use of it, between military history 
and what they call military criticism. They held that while history and criticism 
served different ends, scholars could serve both without violating their professional 
oaths. Indeed, they felt it essential that they do so. What they had in mind was 
not the application of military history so much as the application of the military 
historian. Military criticism was a means to advance an understanding of war.49
 The godfather of seapower theories, Mahan, suggests an outline for analysing 
and understanding wars as they have occurred in history. This outline is an indis- 
pensable aid in keeping clearly in view the essential points around which further 
analysis can be made. He said that regardless of whether a belligerent is in a strate- 
gically offensive or defensive position, he must establish a hierarchy of objectives. 
This hierarchy should include immediate, middle-range and long-range objectives; 
47  Antulio J. Echevarria II, Globalization and the Nature of War, Army War College: Strategic  
  studies institute (2003), pp. v-vi.
48  Mewett, "Understanding war’s enduring nature alongside its changing character."
49  Roger Spiller, "Military History and Its Fictions," The Journal of Military History 70, no. 4 (2006):  
  p. 1093. See also: Peter Paret, "Hans Delbruck on Military Critics and Military Historians," Military 
  Affairs 30, no. 3 (1966). To further detail this statement with regards to Clausewitz: Clausewitz  
  formulated a body of significant considerations and dynamics for which no hard evidence  
  could exist, and insisted that these factors had to be imagined and related to known historical  
  facts in order to comprehend the moral aspect of supreme command. In other words, a critical  
  component of the larger theoretical edifice presented in On War defined the terms of synthesis  
  of that for which there was no record, and thus neither summarised nor distilled history, but  
  complemented it. (Sumida, "The relationship of history and theory in On War: the  
  Clasuewitzian ideal and its implications," The Journal of Military History 65, no. 2 (2001). See 
  also: Pellegrini, The Links between Science, Philosophy, and Military Theory: Understanding  
  the Past, Implications for the Future, p. 45. and Azar Gat, A history of military thought: from the  
  Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 182, 193-194, and  
  254-255.)
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the geographical areas for the main effort; and the geographical areas for the 
secondary effort, where defence can be distracted, and strength dissipated in favour 
of the primary areas.50 When analysing naval warfare, present or historically, 
through such a lens, Mahan drifts towards being a military critic rather than a 
military historian – which indeed could be said to be what differentiates a seapower 
theorist from a naval historian.
 Whenever discussing applied use of history, it is wise to consider whether the 
course of history can be regarded as a laboratory for testing hypothesises at all. In 
his monumental, A Study of War, Quincy Wright suggested that generalisations 
are possible if one can identify the right perspective.51 Gaddis on the other hand, 
claims that whenever we set out to explain a phenomena, such as a historical 
phenomenon, we cannot replicate; everyone in some way or another relies upon 
acts of imagination.52 However, military theory is not about predicting the future 
but preparing for it. Therefore, by using history to develop and test theory, even if 
the historical empirical data is inaccurate, it still expands the ranges of experience, 
both directly and vicariously, and hence renders military theory using history as its 
laboratory more scientific. At the very least, it helps identifying the questions that 
ought to be asked and the issues that need to be though through.53 And even as 
history does not provide prescriptions, it is still an aid to prediction for the simple 
reason that what happens tomorrow is not independent of what happened today 
or yesterday. ‘The future has no place to come from but the past,’ wrote Richard 
Neustadt and Ernest May, so the study of the latter inevitably sheds some light on 
what to expect in the former.54
 Another important question is to determine what kind of historical analysis one 
could use and how it should be employed. History is always an interpretation made 
by a historian. Moreover, history is usually written with hindsight, and events are 
often analysed out of context. Such combinations can easily lead to conclusions and 
generalisations entirely unfounded in what actually took place, and more so if used 
for preconceived ends or to underline a particular line of thought.55 Having this in 
mind whilst reading, for instance, Mahan provides some disturbing insight. Mahan 
wrote didactic history, it really makes little difference which of his books on the 
influence of seapower one reads: The lessons will be the same.56 He wrote history 
that patterns the past after the present, in which what might be learned from the 
50  Rosinski, The Development of Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski, p. xiii.
51  Widén and Ångström, Contemporary Military Theory: The dynamics of war p. 174.
52  John Lewis Gaddis, "History, Theory, and Common Ground," International Security 22, no. 1  
  (1997): p. 78.
53  Inspired by Michael Howard, The Lessons of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 11., and  
  Till, Seapower, p. 27.
54  Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in time: the uses of history for decision-makers  
  (Free Press, 1986), p. 251.
55  John E Jessup Jr. and Robert W. Coakley, A guide to the study and use of military history  
  (Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1979), p. 76.
56  Ibid., p. 80.
198
event or pattern rather than the historicity of the event itself was important. Mahan 
thus represents a line of theorists on war who used history for preconceived ends.57 
Mahan’s methodology must therefore be questioned, but his findings ought not to 
be discarded. His counsel is of abiding value maybe not so much for the answers, 
but because they help to identify the questions that need asking.58
 To conclude I turn to John Lynn who writes that: military history can be used to 
recognise trends and provide advice. Moreover, while events do not repeat them- 
selves, patterns in war can usefully be discerned. For example, on the conventional 
battlefield, there are only so many operational gambits available to the commander. 
Options such as penetration of the enemy’s centre or left or right turning movements 
were available to Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar.59 Likewise, the strategic 
options that command of the seas offered Rome during the Second Punic war are 
very similar to what seapower offered the British during the 18th century, and even 
translate directly to contemporary options and challenges experienced by states 
that must account for the maritime in their strategic decision-making.
 
CONCLUSIONS
 But it must never be forgotten that the true use of history is not to make men clever 
 for next time; it is to make them wise forever.60
Sir Michael Howard
 Throughout this text I have questioned whether seapower theories holds ex- 
planatory value or even normative status with regards to maritime strategy and 
naval warfighting. The short answer is – yes, they do, but probably only if they are 
understood or placed in context. Their applicability beyond their time, technology 
and space is undetermined and will likely remain so. Naval warfare is scare, far 
between, and a complex social activity, hence, experimentation analogous to hard 
sciences is unattainable. Instead of experimentation, seapower theory rests firmly 
on generalisations drawn from historic analyses. However, such applied use of 
history is not without pitfalls and scientific challenges. One cannot simply learn 
from history as history does not teach lessons.61 However, all future events always 
come from no other place than the past. The past hence inevitably sheds light on 
57  Amos Perlmutter and John Gooch, Strategy and the social sciences : issues in defence policy  
  (London ;,Totowa, N.J.: F. Cass, 1981), p. 32
58  Geoffrey Till, ed., Maritime strategy and the nuclear age 2. ed. (London: MacMillan, 1984), p. 258.
59  Gary Sheffield, "Military past, military present, military future: The usefulness of military history," 
  The RUSI Journal 153, no. 3 (2008): p. 104.
60  An abbreviated quote from the closing paragraph of: Howard, "The use and abuse of military  
  history."
61  This line is borrowed from Michael Howards famous statement “History does not teach lessons.  
  Historians may claim to teach lessons, and often they may do so wisely, but ‘history’ does not.”  
  See Howard, The Lessons of History, p. 11.
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what to expect in the future. History is our only empirical source to how seapower 
works, and such insight ought primarily not to be used to describe or predict the 
future, but to criticise and to guide our understanding. Such generalisations can 
be derived from history – if history is studied as Sir Michael Howard concluded in 
his 1961 seminal essay; in width, only by seeing what does change can one deduce 
what does not; in depth, one must get behind the order subsequently imposed by 
the historian and recreate the omnipresence of chaos and criticise; and lastly in 
context, as wars are conflicts of societies.62
 But most importantly, using history alone is not the perfect methodology to 
develop and evaluate seapower theory regardless of method, sources or how one 
conjunct knowledge. History is certainly important, even vital, especially as a vast, 
but opaque, source of empirical data. Still history is always influenced by hind- 
sight, imagination, and interpretations, and depict a context long gone. Hence, 
use of military and naval history ought to be combined with other methods when 
theorising seapower. Taken together, a combination of contrasting approaches 
offers an opportunity to cover the weaknesses of each with the strengths of others. 
However, what those methods are, or could be, is beyond the scope of this paper.
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